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GEOGRAPHICAL 

CHAfT:3R I 
Owing to the fact that this thesis deals with a foreign topic, it W:3.y 
be more understandable to the reader if a general slU'V8Y is given of the lJ:oa.q 
people, land, and goYe%"l.'ll'lElnt. 
Iraq covers a total of 172,000 square miles of a. triangular shap«l 
area.. Its base I'1m8 south-1rest to north-west from the Syrian desert up to the 
mountains ot TurkE11. Its apex terndns.tes northward. on the Persian Gul1.'. 
Bounding the upper edge toward the east are the mountains of Iran, and on the 
lower edge toward the west and south are the frontiers of Syria, Jordan, Saudi-
Arabic and Kuwait. 
Iraq is a oountry of geographical contrasts. In the northeastern 
corner are the mountains of lurdistan 'With peaks reaching to 11,000 feet or 
more. To the west and south vast desert areas .extend into Syria and the 
A.rabian Plateau. the norlbtrn and south~ de~ .98 they are oalJ.ed, to-
~ 
gethv with the Wind dUm, - between the u.pper reaches ot the Tigris and. 
Euphrates rivers - form fort,.-seven per Gent of the total area. Theae vast, 
level, sandy stretches. broken in parts by the uplands and rocky hills. are 
lI'aterl .. s and uncultivated, and inhabited onl.7 by ~o3Bss, 'nomads' With their 
nocks and oamels. But, the h&art oj'Iraq, is the .1im.4 !ll.1!2. r;\venb the 
Tigris and Etiphrates, which nae jn the mounta.:1ns of TurkEV to fiOff south-
eastward through Iraq,. They approach within twenty miles or eaoh other on the 
level of Baghdad, and diverge again before finally uniting at 9\Uj1f to .form 
1 
2 
the broad navigable ~~ to' the laet 1lS miles of their C()U.I'Be into 
the P$l"sin,n Oult" The nat, tre''llandGUSly rertUe, alluvial plain stretohing 
about t~e.d mUes up i.'!rom the Persian Gulf, and one-~ mUea in 
lfidtb, contains two-thirds of Iraqi. cultivated. l.anc4 
North of the allu.v1al plain lie the uplands 01 Iraq. In the !!!mA-
~jn triangle is an \1Zldul.at1ng plateau 01 gravel. steppe and neb 
plough land, avera.ging one-thousand meters in lI1dth. ia.Wall, aver&g:1ng 
eighteen :1.nehe. a ~. is suft101ent. till" 1d.nte.r cereals, fruit-, and vinea to 
be grolftl. 
Iraq bas a tap_ate cHute, With. hot dry sunJllIerSt cold damp winters I 
and brief' transitional sea-soaa in Apr1J. and November. 
Iraq i8 underpopulated 1n proponion to its area and resouroe. The 
populat.ion at the last oensus in 1947, totaled 4.816,000. low 1t 1$ est1mnted 
at a little OTer .tiTe-million. 
Iraq is an ~ ~tl"Y. Ialam U 1;he religioD far 4;500,000 of its 
~. Tb«re li\nJ alao about t1ft:>-~*'hou.Hnd Cbr1st1ana touad. 1n all the 
" 
prinotpal 4lOmm.Unitiea, repNSCt1ng .four sen.- ;;:rri;m ~t Mmiia, 
CW4_~ _ Sma g,:t:bQl&.. Other small but 1ntereRing m1norlt:1.ee are 
totmd. n.re are about 32,000 leaMM 'W'ho bel.:leve in the pr1noiple of evil. 
'l'h ... are about. 6,600 s~ who are followers of St. John the Baptist_ 
Iraq as a OOIlstitut1o.nal monarchy, has a written constitution. It 
clearly defines the position and prerogatives of the ~, the right.a and 
obligatiOO8 of the people, the structure of the legp.slature, and the ministry 
of justin. 
.3 
Th. problem of L .. bor :L~'l Iraq has three intare1a'ted 4'usp$Ots: soo::1a1, 
political, and economic. Tiley all stem from the fact that Iraq is a back~ 
eO'l'.l'ntryj or as classified by the United flations, as nile or the ~eveloped 
coU1'lt:d... Iraq 1s moving in a vieious c1rQ1. ot ~y, Ul1teraoy, disease, 
and a semi-feudal system which .makes the circle ocmplete. 
Poverty afflicts the vast ma.jority o£ t.he people. The standard ot 
living is deplorably 1011' and is almost the same· today as it was thirty- ~s 
ago. No cGmp:-ehenaive studies ot inoome in Ira.q have been made. 1t 18 t.rue 
that the statin.ica1 oftice of t.he United l%ittioM in 1949, made an estimate 
ot e1ghty.n1ne dollars pm" peraon a year.1 This. how.,. .. , 1s hardly more than 
a. rough guess without any real basis. A !aore accurate picture can be derived 
from a;~ the wages of workers. l'n 1939, the ru1n:tmnm wage earned· (not 
statutorily £!xed) I vms about ,UtZ.m.t A Sa If'~ <tents'.2 Und ... 1_ 
l'nlIIber 54 of 1953, the :minimum wa:.;e tor a. J.a.borer is spec1:fiad as ~o .£aa 
'2.~ daz 1 seYsutzr-t'lft) celts t • If a eompariBon is made with a laborer's cost 
" 
of living tor BaghdAd, it appears that tJ:de:"1_ causes a laborer's &'t3llda.rd. 
of living to undergo little ~.j i ..... he now earns five times his pr~ 
wage. IN.'to the prices at the oommodities he bU1J$ have Also :increased nearly 
lift time8. 
r lilt 
4 
In ~ to 1lJJ.tera«y, out, at 3,127,045 (total population CNfIII: 
five year. old o~ theki-!!!, t statee' a~ the t:i..tB.$ ot the la$t. oenwa in 1947, 
exoluding the ..... d trib_> 3,319,469. or eighty-n:1.'rle pel" cent" ~ 
UUtel-ak.) 
The standards of health are very 1_. Thousand. or Iraqis taU 
vietdm ~ year to tuberO:.1l.osi8, trach$iJA, bilharzia I mal..a"ia. ~, 
a.nd ~tary. Statisti_ about t-h$ spread of d18ee.aea are mislea,&g, bat.h 
to actual and relative incidence of the different diseas"t beca:llse th«r 4i'e 
related onl...., to Qt;.ses actually trt:mted.. As a matter of £act" diaea.IIIH are 
much l'!lOrfJ w1.daly spread than the e9.sea t:re.'1ted" 1MUld llflJ.gzest. NeverthlSl$,., 
Table I gives an idea. about the health situation in Iraq. 
Ka~1a • .. .. • • • • .. • 
B1.J.haJ:tia • ;, '" .. .. .. • • 
Hookworm. ........... . 
fra~ "'... ;, • .. .. • 
D~ ........... . 
tuberoaJ.Ow ......... . 
1951 
456,299 
351 26h 16,18 
671,599 h ,569 
9,925 
aa_. treated. 
". 1952 1953 
409,07$ 4$1,040 
32•6Zi 291~ 2~.6 19.1a1 61'm 4iJ9,?27 !..j.6,18 )1.,449 
ll, 6,746 
AlWMsmiit\PJ .2l."§f,.tWTlQi, Ir8.CJ. goftl'nmt'mt Depa.rtme:at of Ste: . as, l%j--; 
All these i'act.ors worked tog&thel- :md are still "WOrking to ouaet 
the progress of the soc::L:ll a..""l.d eoonomic status 01' th-e 1)"lOp1e of' Iraq in 
M r 
.3 lb~., 2, 231. 
genaral. a."ld the labor force in particular. The Gour;.t.r"tJ oporates by a semi-
feudalirrt.ie ~"Ystem TiheI'e a fJm.aJ.l Gl'OUP of landlords and ind:u.st.rif'1ists who 
have the political power in their hane4.a, prevent al''lY truly progres~i"e proet'D 
labor problem. 
'lhe :i.m:nortanee of the labor ~r®len is altto 010501'" connected with ,. ~. \..' 
the development of Iraq. rltl..rty ;;rea.rs ago, a sound labor ymlitr; Cotl.ld not 
as"llmO a vit.al lZfJpnrt:.nnce for the reason that in th08~ de,;';"8, :.!.ndustry in the 
modern sense never existed. fuwever, oomparat~vely recently, and 6I;peC".l. . :::.11y 
after the second world WF3.I' , with the rapid deve10pi11ent of ir.idustry 11&l!l come 
the recogniUorJ. ot the vital ~rtanfJe of a sound labor policy to regulate 
the relationship. between EIDlployers and er:zployees, and to elevate the status 
of the UDderpr1YUepd~. A:t:rr system of industrial l.~e1atioM in tho 
mod.c'n America."l sense of the term, p'l"e-supr..oses the e::d.stenee of worker t s 
orga:n:tmations capable of representing their m.embers in their relations lIIi th 
employers. Such orga.nisations ·,ud.sted J but • sound ~ o£ labor relntions 
'j 
never developed. 
B. ISSm'S, EOONOmGAl.-POLITlCAJ.. 
. ~ , 
I.~ :t!!Dl§! 
Until the first quarter at the Trie.'l\ieth Century, Iraq ~ was 
ba..eci on a self-contained r.l'stem of subei6'tence agriculture, eru:p"l1mented by 
cottage industries and trade .guilds. the intpaet of \iQstetn penetration h:ts 
af!ecrted a drastic change in this .1tuatior. One of the direct CC-, :;',eou8nCf S 
6 
there are no statinics available about the national 1.noame in Iraq 
blSd'ore the .. and world war. In 1947-48. the national income was 2),(f('(),OOO 
\ 
dinarS. i,; In 195)-54, 1\ ha.dr1aen to 48,,000,,000 d1..na.ra. For the year 1956-
$7. it. ftS whl&ted ~ 62,000,000 ~a. H.<rtrwer. no O$timat. of nat;1anal. 
inCJ()ll$ in ~ is at all reliable, since the -.jonty of the workers are 
engaged in agr1oulture. whore the greater pa;rt of th4d..r ~ is in ldDd" and 
their ea.h inoou is $mUu.5 'or this reason. the nat1ona1 ~ in Iraq in 
the .ense in 'Which the tel'm 1. usua.J.q em:plo7ed. it it were aecurateJJ 
assessed, would. alford no comp61·1$OA nth Qountries which va ~ on a 
cGtsh or market ~. 
In a¢cmlture, wh:lc111$ the backbone ot the econQmj". and 'IIh$re the 
bulk of the people are engaged, the land ttllm11'O 1,TSt-. where the farmer 1. II 
sl1ar'e tcmant, 18 a ve:t!1 serl.ws probltm. It does not allow production t.o 
iIierease beeaua. 01 the lack of incentive for greater e.t'f1cietlC"J OX' capital 
investment. ow." recently, a<:ientific methods in ftrrming were introduoed an 
a sW.l soaJ.e. ixtensive farming and ebifting ~~;j,vitHm 3.r$ character18t.:1u 
'C 
of agriw1ture in ~aq. There is little use of 1:arm aaCb.:inery. and onlY' on&oIo 
fifth of 'the cultivated land in Iraq is aotua.ll7 bdng cultivated. As a 
result of this backnrd stat. o:t economio organization, productivity 1$ l_ 
and. per capital national income ot the farmer 1$ low. The.Jz!g, D~.i 
Board ~ sftWal y$A1!:S ago to utllize 4 portion of oU revenu.ee for: 
l.mproTina t.he ar,rstems of irrigation and drail'lage, to brine more lJmd ~ 
4 A dinar equals 12.80 
5 Salter, Il! DlVIlDpmrr £!.1!!AS, l~). 
7 
cultiva.tion. Dama and barrlers are now 'I.1DdW oonstru.4tion to CODtrol md 
managEl the now of the 1'1gria and luphrates r1vel"S. 
The und~fWeloped state o£ agriwlture Mts limite t.o the oapac1ty 
tor industr1al1Htlon, by causing low purchas1ng power £or the rural population 
and a limit.ed market lott manufaotu:red goode. 'tbere i8 litt.le o}:l'portun1ty for 
larae aoaJ.e, 10111' coat manufacturing enterpri$U _pable of eomp-inI against 
the products of irtdustriilized nations.- }lost, of the -.rly indu&'t.ries extsted 
and are tridll existing .th the help of tar1ff proteetlon. The· dtrf'elopmea\ 
of industry ftS bamp..-ed \0 a. great ext.et by insufficient _pital t'OJ! 1nYest-
meat J b~ of the lO1f income of the peopJ.e and th«lr ll.m:i:lied ability to 
~. Anotther lIm-ious obstacle 1s the sbortap 01 sldlled 'fIOrlcera, ~~ 
trained adminiBtratol"8j shop foreman, and t:.t~ una..... As a oonseque:n4e, 
ther$ has 80 far been little large scale industrial d.eTelopment in Iraq. 
Table n of the large indu~ .in Baghdad bU$d. .. the averap ~ of 
amploy-eea show's the pneral patt.ern. 
Industry 
TA.i1L.E II 
loA.RO~ lJ'IDUDTRJ:EB IN lWJIIDA,D 
Ntuuber o! F1rms 
BriCks, TU_ • .to. ,. • •• • • •• 21 
Cem.ent, ... • " " .. !I .. " .. " .. .... 1 
~ct1an. • • .. • • .. • • • ... 8 
Electrioity and Wator Supply.. .. .... 4 
TatU ...... ., •• ., ........... 16 
Cigarettes and Tobaoco. .. .. • .. ... ...h 
''''l. ::>t+ 
l~um:ber of 1mplO't,re&S 
total A"t'C'B..p 
3,532 168 
3#~~ ~ 
1,192 298 
4,.$10 261 
J:..J~ 345 
1.3.934 
a 
In ~, tondgn trade per oapit-a is '¥'ery lmf &nd "'Nt exports 
are mainly food produc:$s and raw .mat.erials. laports are ~ ~cturecl 
goods. Iraq wu and shill ia eutf'erlng from a deticlt balance in its merna1 
trade. 
n. mineral wealth of Iraq has never been properly pro~ 
(exclud:f.Ag oil), but t.here 1s eridanoe of vaJ:tlAbl.. auppUe$ of pooJJpha.tes. 
manga.nes., and iron .. 
1'0 INIl UP. IRq lUiS gNat eeonom14 pot,alt1aJ.ities, POSHQU large 
areas of arable land:l a vast; supply of tft:~ter, derives ample lunda of it. 
os tor dtlftl~ put"p08eS f.rQm on royalties, and has a population a 
lit"l. OYer f'i~ion. Iraq has an opportunii,y for econOJnicdcmtlo~ 
equal to any or the new .t1a:tions in an.., p.qrt of the world. 
EoM~ ifni! 
By and large ~ large labor _~t throughout the "1"10. _8 
intlueneedt.o a greater or a lesser d~ in one or more s~ges of iu 
dewlopm~ by polili!c8. this is true noit onl:r in respect. \0 labor 11lOY_en'. 
" 
but of l!IOe1al movement .. in gell$l"al. ii. A.. Vorrison streeee., Il(A)t &vttJ.7 
point social re:torm depends upon politioal changes,.116 The taoor in lraq, as 
a part of the ao<d.al mvement, not only was and still is influenced by 
politics, l:nrb represtmta an extreme caBfh 'rilis is why a po!~tio:n of this 
research is deYoted to the political background of Iraq. 
T. begin With, the 2i~ goTermaent and lat:Gr tfi..El ~Ib. U1 
order to ~ public order nt.h the least po.sible expenditUl'e of n'~ 
hi 
9 
and I:~:)()1fer J 'were obliged to l"$l;r on the power of the landlords! who were 
semi-£eudal forces wl"doll stood against. any sooiaJ. change. Tlle .. tabu..hlnen~ 
of an independent natlonal goT~t in 1932. 'RS not enough to change th:Ls 
Git~Ltion, tor it, is necessary that suob a ~t be trtlJ.:y democraUc 
and repr~ta.tive of the peop~e't The forces whose il.'1torests 'IJ\'l'rIe thre&tened 
by $ociol. progress and enlightentileil1t.; were at.Ul in power and controlled the 
new goyertll'nent. It 1$ true that some ~ reeponslble elements ~8fki 
their desire to ta.ka steps tor soeiaJ. retom, but they s1.mpl3' echoed ideas 
which had never actually been practioed. itQn.l;y too o.f't~ promises of ~ 
reaeh1ng 1"'etorms have bean scattered over elecrt.iQneering prO~in&S and 
speeches at the opening of Parliament t but 1n prru.Aioe llt-t.le P.8S been. 
a chi_edt 1f7 
fhe political issues whioh make Iraq such a unique case oan hI) 
eumm.a.rized as follows. 
a. The pol1tiaal. inatahi.Uty wb1ah manifested itsill in the 
peat frequemq of cbal1ges in ~s,,~ No governmant could ata.r in 
• 
office longer thtm six months. In the 27 ~s ~ the period 19U-19>0, 
theN "ere tOrty-t1V8 ~sJ more than one a year.a 1'hi.e polit1eal 
instability did nat all_ enough time tOI' the ~Jlant.G to d«f'elop and 
Q&l."ry out tllid.r pr~J5. 
h. The axistence or a s'illl:i.-feudal ~ whare .a. group ot landlords 
are in Q.oo\rol of t.h$ ~t. Jon l1w.che in his trip to Iraq finds t.ba.., 
10 
tithe pemaents of the pe.n thirty ,.-eare have been d:;.' lin from the same f'1ftq 
or sixty .r8ndlie5 ..... ~ the periodic revolutionary u:pri.sing has producad an 
oec.iii.donal new Of!mler. '01" t.he rest it Ms been governments Ez the sheikhs, 
their nominees and .f'r1en4s, 'lOr the sheikhs, their nominees and friends".9 
c. Demecracy in Ire.q has never be.e.n perfeo1ted, because a. basic con-
cept of dem.ocrac;y by a strong, influential., organised opposit.ion neT"- de"nI-
loped to power. Tnf-' following is why this condi\1cm e:dt\'ltst 
(1) The Weetem powers in their canservati va pol1.cy o.ften failed 
to 8\tpport the minority liberal g1'attps againerh the majority of the l.mdlorda. 
George Hakim states, "the western powers have :ir1 the Fa'" ~ernll:r np~ 
the reac\ionar;,r semi-feudal toroes .... and have thus ~ the enmity 01 \bit 
r1&1ng progressive roreeslt • 10 
(2) The progressive foroes oould not develc) QJlOugb lrifrengtb "' 
enable them \0 gain control over the government. This is due to the .fact. tl:la\ 
the micldle elMs 'Whicb usually SllIJP0l"'ts such groups is still i'rl.!ant. As Mlajid 
Ihs.dduri haasa.1d, "the position of the m.od~!'at. and liberal groups in IX"aq 
.;.1 S rendered the mDn hopeless by t.he abSCtce of .an im:port....~t middl; clas ..... 11 
d. Otten, the liberal groups being .tru.Bt.rated in theh- effona, 
shUted their a.ttent.ion fJoom the eooial and economic issuas'.to imternatlouel 
issues like COD'ID3.t.ting :l.mperLuim. 
9 ~EV'&N F!M!! PIlJ..A.BS, New York, 1953 .. 100. 
ed. 
10 I1Social and Economio Problem") BAClmtOUlm OF THE MIDDLE EitS'1', 
Emest Jaekk, N..- York, 1952 .. 164. . - - . -
II llIDiPmD1liN'l~, London, 1951. 11. 
II 
tho history of Iraq du:rm[; the p'::'cst thirty years, not only oonverterS the effort 
of maintaining social rafOrntF to 5trengthcnine the ::,r;.rw, but axn..austed the bud-
ge~ tor Sr~ possible basic refo~~ 
C. ::;01.JRCES l~m :.~HODS or ruz;.Sll:.L1CH 
r J' 
The t.ileme of this thesls is pe()pla f'5 lal:w)rers. What is outside 
this sphere w:.'l.11 either be omitted or 1iscussed only briefly t.o ~ive a ba.ck;. 
ground to the linited scene d.epicted.. 
!~o student: of res{1.<.reh of cn~ant or recent ev~ oan be ,J1QSitlve 
tJ:lat he h')s ch:;;eked, all of tho published E0:trcos of n'11'.eriDj. d,;:a~ingwith the 
.' 
subject of his resc:ot'ch; nor can he quote a specific autho!'i1"y for GTer:Y' stat .. 
lllSnt made. One oannot be that pos.itive and can only hope that the b.tbliog:raplq' 
tor th1e thesis om.";~ts no reQ.).17 valuable work. A varied and (selr;lot1ve 'range 
of Qonte1Tlp<)1"3l'y newspf1:pel"S and pericdioal.s e£ local and forei~ oOltmVioe ha.ft 
bee used" Iil6 well 1:1.5 histories and mont'Jgraphe, ,in both, Arabic and lnftU.fih. 
Translating i'ran ~ of the m,~terlal. fro.1l\~ Att'ti'.bic to Inglish may have renlW 
" 
1."1 same ni5.l!1interpretations. 
A eol.U'Ce of llt'1.terial 1'tb.1.ch does not awear in the hibUography 1s 
the obsel"'V'tltions and 1.nformation deri'Ved from, ~JC'sonal e.~flnee of the au~ 
a$ a citizen of Iraq. 
.A..., ~~ CQl!!'i!OL TO rHE 1.912'. 
(1) ~h J198~ bet~ ,t,be tt=:~ ,~rW ,rs 
The 1'ur1dsh inQueace in Iaaq began 181534, aAd c~inued to the 
t~ IJ.rld ~~. Tile Ottoman En!pire .. basicall7 mUit.a.t7' in ~ and. 
ol"pQiat.ion.. The aa:bl :-oal DB t bG QJ..t~ 'of the fSt.ate. not the weUare (iJt 
the nb.1etta. It _Se. lIa state .. gan.:lled prima.ril.)r tm! lWU"taft rat.hel- tbm:& 
fo!' the welfare o:! 1tapeopl.lt.12 :(raq in theN daya was divided int,o tbI'M 
WS!l~*" '~.'= &~,:t4omul and Ba.s.n.Ih. 'rhG IUtl,et1on of the p~ 
"riDoea was ;.0 pt'<Wi.de the estral ~t with revWUM in the· to_ of ... 
erial wealt.h and ~' tor~. ~.,.~ fIW~'· ~ 
tohe;y lIlU"e local l.ords, l\u'ld.:th o£,ficiaJ.s J or ~, • ela~. t tought tor .... 
cend~ l_~ the people 8'Il!!ering trora. corrupt1o!1, ~($e and lit .. 
o~ of jlUJt.iee. The c-.t.m aut..hor:iv .;1n"-'t'erEKi llttle in tbi atfairll 
of the people ~ that ita d-.ads .... _~ 'l'he ouJ.y 1l'5eri'~ .. 
OIl ,,1'1. pari; of the local otttc1als of tlle :rul.il1gorwad or 1,oe.. Cathali~ m1s-
a±o.ms W'el"$ adm:itted.in the seventceen~h CClli'Ul"y, though they weN IiiUbjeoted '\0 
ahaages1n local ~t1e$. 
Ammg t.he o~. dominated by i\trke:y j Iraq stood in a Ullique p~ 
t,1c!Ir4 "Tho dilt~l.,. t_t.ve at the Iraqi situat.1ou ~ from the p~ 
12 Pbillp K .. Hltt.i, HJft.f!q 9L ~. AliABS, London" J$S6. 716. 
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1) 
deranee of the Shott elar;.hmt :In tho population, difficulty 0::: cQt:.:,umieatj,on 
with ht'ladrmart.era in Gon~t~.ntino'r)ltl. rxt'O.rl.rdtv or Slmt PfD1Jiu and. clee:vaee 
J. " " ...... ~_ .......... 
betw$on towns a.nd trlb.e.s. IflJ 
The observer of Iraq during the 1'urkish 1"Ula CP.Jl sec only tl. dilrk 
pioture. !he only bright .spot if} the pel"iod het1'l~an lB69-1872 J durine the ~ 
mWstratiO,c"1 ot :t.t:'!dha:t. Paaha.,· th2: 11'heral and y)rG ... 'Sl"eB:dwj su.te~Ul.. tlHi~+: 
........ ~ J. 
Pasha. ••• in tl1.re0 short. years began to ·org~e for the .fi.rst til'll()! a system of 
Ia:'" ..... 
land regi$t,l"'atiQ.~.~ ... lle lnr .. de plans for river-reela..~t:ion, river nFl;vigation, 
industria.ll!;ation, town ~t.6. He .founded n'll.n'liQ:lp;Jl~_ ti9S and f.tflm:LrJ. .... 
tratlve coune:1.ls J enforced conscription, tried, but fnilcdLo !ml>pl"ess C~ 
ruption. and in. &ghdad ~&d a n~par, military facto1"ice, a hoar~ital, 
an r~'lllS-hou6e, an orphanage, and rrv.mel"OUB 54h001$ '~here'bzr the lit.e.r:::"C:f·-rnte 
?~'1 townspeople !'oa$ from. pe-rbape one.b.a1f P~TCQl1t :b~ 13,0, to SQLil\) fi'V"e to 
ten percent by 191'JO. a14 
In s})ite of (!~1 thecae devel~ts;. t.he h1stQr1an of modern 1ftq 
C'O'IWludee r liThe country passed :t'r0l'1 the ~e.t~th oentury little lese 1t11d 
, 
a.nd ignorant.. u m'lfitted for "l£-g~i and not less eorrup\) tltan itt 
had entered the s1.xteenth; nor hed it-m strma.,l.rds of matorial life outstrlppe4 
its standards or mind and character. It-8 resoun:flS lay untouched" haf;ever. 
clearly inOicated by t..fiIe faae\lB ages of the ~ ad b;y the VV'1' face of 1;be 
. e~r.r. [J15 
• d ,. 
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At the start 01' t.he twentieth .... cel1tm ... Y Iraq p:.rrticipfJ:ted in several 
move:monts which h..1.ve b(;len initiated in the 1O.ddJ.a-~:lst, p.::rtly (;is a protest 
{Jgainst :i'urkish mis-rule ~ind cOl'ruption" .rnd l)art.ly as a nationcl move1.'lcnt. 
Iraqi officerfl in the 'I"u.rkish tll""J.U'!J joined the secret socie.ty £-~, founded 
in Constuntinop1e to _work: for the :Ultependenoe of Arab px'winces. A1-Ahd clad 
branehes in the three principal oit.ies of Ira'll Baghdad, Mosul al'ld Ihsrah. 
But th8se movements were never .fully coordinated, Great faitb W£lS placed for 
a short while in the victory of i:J.le young ~ party over .:::ultan Abd~ ~~d g 
in 1900; but the YO'tlrlg Tu:ri<;. party proved to be as 'lJI'lS'ytlpa:t;hetie· towards the 
Arab's clD.ims astbe Sultan h:i.mse1f. The nega:1;ive attitude of the Y,?\Ul£ ~ 
pushed the iu-ab nationa.l.ists to the more e:<:treme demands which cuJ..minated in 
the revolt or 1916. 
(2) !:!-:,1tish oontrol to the 1930'. 
.. At t.lte outbreak of the first ';'arld I,ar the British occlUpied Basrah 
bee:."u:. c of d.ts importanoe ,.. tho' security of their position in the P\;)rsian 
Gul:f' and the safety or their communioatioo$ )'nth Incllil. In the eourse of the 
,ar tho lower part 01' Iraq was oonquered. in 191'7; GenerU;l Mauqe cc~,mand:5 ng 
:3ritiah foroes entered Baghdad and issued the 'wi'e1J......known proolimG.tiOll, th,;.t the 
british came as fl1iberators, !!2i oonquerors ll • A.t t.he saue tlltlG, a great event 
was taking :p1:.06 in ~~')cca; the heart of the Ar('.bi2l1 f'eni.ns'l..Ua, which affeatt"rl 
the who.1.e Arab ,world. A secret a.greement was reeo;L.:( .. h,S a result of the Ilc1lahoq 
eOrrE)sponcience 01' 191:;,;-J..9lc), between Great Britain and the Shex:if ~~ of 
I:eeca roprcsonti:ng thc; Arabs. According to this D.;;:re(-~'lt, '!:,hc Aru:;G,¥vulJ. 
revolt :~:::,ainGt t he Turks, and their rew~:cC:; '::'ox' tby ris};: 'the:r ',:;;::0 t:Jd . .n~.~ .. mulct 
be independ.ene... Morrison streSSIJS t.l'.ds as .be statos, It lJ:i. tho ~ of ~ 
l<ey's deteat t the 1ndepend<mee at the A'rab states 1Iill be reoo~ed by Ozioeat 
Br1t.air11r.1thin ·the t.err1tor1ee in Which Great Britain is free to aat. Wit.hoUt 
the detr:i.w:mt to thG intereats of her al.l;r hance, and aecoJ'ding 'to 1;,he l:Lm:1:w, 
and boundries proposed by t.he ~~~ !! !!9.!i-u16 In ~r 1918. a jo1nt 
AntLo.Ftoenab military declaration st.at-ed that. it was their aim to estabUeh in 
Syria and Iraq national gove~ts !Uld admin10"t.ra.tions denving their aut~ 
ities from the in1t iative and free choice of the indigenau:s populat.1<>n. The 
doubts ot 1;ho. Ar.lba wel*e re.:"IOved by ~t ~C4,l '01 the On.1ted stat_ of 
America.. One of the !'3lilOus .t~ B9H!~ states I ~sh pol"ti.o;Q$ of ~ 
pt'$$esri.Ot.toman Empire should be. aS5'U.r'ed a ~ 8OW!'~), b\1t.~ot.b.er 
na1iionalit.1ee wbiGh are n<W 'underfus1dsh rt4e should be assured ~W 
seourit;,. of 11te,.mt.d absol:u.tely unmol~ opporturdt,y of aut.on~ deve-
lo~.· 
Arab disappointmaDt was bitter. 1t2len a.t, tbe el!Jd oftb$ 'Wal'. the A:t&b 
states w ... denied full independence. 
" 
.en at the conolusion of too ..!!!. _0 ,~£!S!! in 1m, ~ .. 
plaeed under British mndate, revol.ut,1on bx-oke out,. The Z"In'Olu:L1on ..-pt the 
country a1lnul.taneou.sl:r in north and sottth in Xraq.Ch:wernment authority 'bl'okG 
down and p~10Ml. gov~t3 ftre set up 1ft the ~. Cor1que:red bT the 
rtn'ol.utionar:1es. "It took sweral ~ of fighting .. 'tithe diapatch of 70,000 
British troops to IJ'a~ and the ~ture of a. T&st sum or wme,y, to put the 
16 
revolution down. ul"! 
For Iraq, the revolution provided the opportunity to establish an 
Arab government. At the Cairo conferenoe held in the spring of 1921, under 
the chairmanship of ~. Churcbill, then Colonial becretary, the plan was 
agreed upon for the establishment of an Arab government in Iraq under 1>'aisal; 
"the son of :...lherif Hussein 2f Mecca. In August of the s::.une year, Faisal was 
proclaimed King of Iraq. 
The substitution of indireot rule did not change the situation in 
Iraq. liThe British continued to hold the reins of government. The high Com.-
missioner was the real head of the administration, not withstanding the 
accession of a king and the formation of an Iraqi CO\Ulcil of ministers. illS 
The Iraqis were still hostile to the mandate, so, liThe British aware 
of this widespread hostility, offered the mandate in the guise of a treaty of 
alliance. But the treaty hardly clif1'orad from the texts of the mandate. Signa< 
in October 1922, by the British-aprointed Iraqi government, it was widely orit-
icized by the nationalist leaders and the publ1c. u19 This treaty was followed 
'j 
by a number of revised treaties. "In one of~the most important •••• that of 
December 1927, Britain undertook to recognize Iraq as independent and entered 
into a twenty-five year alliance with it. The treaty of June 1930 was decisive 
Britain renounoed its ms.nditory rights and recognized the i\1ll sovereignty of 
17 ':';ir Arnold T •• il1son, ~OfOTAlJA, 1:.2il-1920, london, 1931, 283_ 
18 Nejla Izzeddin, !l§. ~ uOltLD, Chicago, 1953, 191. 
19 ~. 
17 
or Iraq. Two years la.ter the new state was admitted to membership in the lea-
gue of Uations. Thus did this country, despite its large tribal population, 
sectarian division and oomparatively low level of educati')n, become the first 
Arab land to join the family of nations-a. remarkable instance of post-war 
national development. n20 
B. POLITICAL IHDEPENDENCE 
1 
(l) buocession of k:ir!g! 
a. TAl R,QXal family of IraQ whioh is called the Hash.imite family, 
belongs to the Kore1eh, the most distinguished of the iIejaz tribes. Koreish 
had been oustodians of the holy Kaaba at Mec~Al long before the advent of Islam. 
The prophet Mohammed was of the Hashimi te family, and so were the l\bbe,ssid 
Cal1plw. It was through the Hashimite £amily under Sherif Hussein gX Hejaz, 
that the Arab revolt began in 1916 against the ottoman rule. 
b. King Fa1§al I The accession of F'aisal the third son of ~;lheri.t' 
Hussein of Hejaz, as King Faisal I in August 1921, did not bring full inde-
pendenoe immediately, whioh he and the peOple of Iraq had expeoted. It vms not 
" 
untU 1932 that Iraq gained its full independenoe. Thi s 11'f'g.S due in part to his 
moderate approach to dealing with the British, w;rl.oh was to take whc'lt the Brit-
ish were ready to give, and strive for more. IlHe followed a policy aptly in 
oalled in Arabic I take and ask', or, in liestern terminology" t step by step t • Ii 21 
Faisal was a moderating element in the Anglo-Iraqi relations. He was 
able to secure a balanoe between the British and Iraqi nationalists. It wa.s 
20 Mitti HISTORY OF THE ARABS 7r:''l , _ _ , ;;J.J. 
21 Khadduri, INDEPENDENT llUlQ, 5. 
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tl1ua that he WG,a capable both of S<Zlou:ring British a·jr.mpathy for Iraq' ~ mt10nal 
azpil"ationa.. weI of oon:trollin{; t.he·.uatj oo.al.1st. a.1~ltS. 22 
Jft'.icaJ. t s tribal backgraund ~,.o.eit posaiblt~ tOl~ him t.o win the ~. 
Ja."'lOC of the tr:1.be.s.. lI1Jo h~d been a. CQD.b~t ~ ....... dact.te to bot.h Ot~ a.nd Brit-
iuh administratol"S. F .. ;1 [jU 1 played a gJ:'oo'l;. r.ole 1n ·ti.he canstru.ction of the It. 
stat.e. However, this was nQt f!l1~y reoo~o.d until his death in 193', and ~ 
los.,. .~s dO'Jply £',.)11;. in 1:.b$ days 1;hat f~llQ'fled •. 
c. Kini.G~i 1 On ;3eptembal' G, 1933. f:i£inoe 9J:E;i~ K:tng Fa:l.$a.l*$ 
anly son wa~ proaln:.tme6. ~ q~i 1-
and patriotic. I~o:r. he 1a.ck¢d · ... hc· ~CG .,:.11:/:1 .:.;tab:lLty oJ: ide :.eat.her. 
Troub.le3 .and das :;:vents lilG'.l"kacl the six ~U' perio;';. of hiiil !:'eiga. JifD.ny of tl ... 
tl"oubles could h'iva beQn s,v\Xtded it 00 h.;V! ~ th'J.lidsdom. aade.q~oe of: h1f 
father. 
On ~ ... OGQasions h$. had denounced v:i.tUentlyt.he Britieb. &ndlt~ 
\ 
:iJnper~is.o ~ tho 4~t cJ.ai.ms in Palawi..ina. 'This ~ out. ot l.l.1m a .b.aro 
'C 
... 
in thQ .,.~ 0:': tho Arab nutional1ts and the rdlll, ~ rilo .of thtl i)'IilOpl~h nm.a, 
I'eBSIit and fIei-::.- oJ: 1;he Thr0n0 by act o.f :Psl"~i;.. TJnderthe 00lurt.ltutt1on 
or Il'aq. the lC.int; attains l-u.s majority ")0: hiB eigh~nt.h birt~. on tihe 
I '. f .oil, 
22 . Ibid., not~~ 21, 1. 
-
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second of May, 195), therefore, King Faisal. II was crowned King. 
Under the Regency of his uncle, King Faisal II pursued the policy 
initiated by his grandfather King Faisal I. 
At the outbreak of the second 'Norld "ar, Iraq broke off diplomatic 
relations with Germany and stood by its treaty obligations to Gl~at Britain. 
However, differences between the British and the Iraqi government on applica-
tion of certain terms of the treaty, coupled with dissatisfaction with some of 
features of British policy t,oward Iraq, led to the armed revolt of 1941, which 
resulted in declaring war on the allies in the second ~:or1d .. ar, butl~hich 
lasted, howllver, for only one month. After a short fight the British troops 
occupied Iraq in July of 1951, and a government -with a policy of co-operation 
with the British carne into office. 
Atter the end of the seoond~-~orld .iar, the emphasis :was on the re-
vision of the 1930 treaty with ~ritain. The first attempt in this direction 
was in January 19h8, and proved to be a big failure. It was wholly rejected 
after a bloody demonstration on the part of the people. In 1955 a new treaty 
" 
between Iraq and Britain was signed with the nation under the condition of 
martial law. 
( 2 ) Growing pains 
The division of population into tribal and city dwellers, the rival 
between Sinna and Sheit, 'the two major Moslem sects', the existence of 
oppressed ndnorities, the absenoe of a sound derJOcratic system of government, 
the weakness of the foundation of government, and the constant foreign lllter-
vention,-have exposed Iraq to violent political diDturbancos. The period 
b~~~am '19'~-·l9'';7 I ~ j:11lmd ldtb.te.L~ upl"itd.:nQts.. vdllt~ ~~ (it ~~. 
~(~1J~ o! ~M..ti($;f t"nd l,.:t~~ tit.~Jloo. t~U"ing -thi) r')orlod '1:);1: 19'£)....l9ti1. 
a~~ ~tl",!,! d' ,~wt t,ook ~),ner: in h~,q. ~ In,@t 'Of t,ne rdnoriw ro~.-lUOO5 
€t"~ ot t,h~,r, ther,'.t'J te ~1U!!JU8Z tl84 lAbnl", gt,~:lros ~r~~ thO' ~~od ~ 
.. (>tl~- ~,,,, ...... '''';1,~ ~,--.... .... &., ... } ... ,.. ...... 'l,_;/"," , r'L. .... " ... ,',.. .... -. ./I,""'~ 1 .............. _ .. -.,~-.tI>, ... .... J... ,'r.-,J 'l..n;a;.. ,.;'..il\,.",p"":; ~t,.v",· fJ,l..::f·~·1i:4>"''''~»i.:n ....... ~.;,Jf'f71 ~,,_ JiI ~.,!, .-;"\!!'\ ..... ,J ,(~~A ~ \. ..... ?,~.i' . ;4.JlfAi;{ ~.~w'fJ3-'WQ ~
. .~:. 
CHAPTER III 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE fEOPLE 
The social nnd economic status of people in Iraq was and still de-
nends to a great extent on their social and economic system, which is still 
largely in a semi-feudal st<1ge of development. 
This socio-economic system is characterized by a unique social struc-
ture. At the top a wealthy minority forms what is called the upper class. At 
the bottom, a poverty-stricken majority forms the lower class. In between is 
a small and weak middle-class trying to fill the gap in this social structure. 
In order to give a full picture of the social and economic situation 
of the people in Iraq, a mors detailed doscription of this sooial structure 
might be helpful. 
A,. THg UPPER CLASS 
The upper class consists of the wealthy land-owners on one hand, and 
the town's businessmen on the other hand, but without the sharp distinotion 
between these two groups which for.mer~ existed in some European countries • 
.. 
Some members of the well-to-do ~~ies are~concerned with their estates, 
while others are engaged in COlIllnerce. 
l! The land own!!';. 
The big land owners are of tll.'O types; tribal chiefs, and, in.O.uen-
tial townsmen who own the water wells used on the farms (pump-OwtltR1'"e). Be-
fore the British mandate, land was the cammon property of the tribe. The pre-
visions of the mandate, to win support of the ;Jha1khs alloliOO them to secure 
21 
lelal title to Ule lGn<l. whicll bf custommd t;l"adi:~ was the pr-operty ot't.b8 
tribe. The national. aut,oorities followed the ~le of the mruxlate and haaded 
over large estates to their #UppQ1~s.. It did not take long before the 
shaikhs 84~ the attl"':ibutes o! l&nd lords. !'hey eon'Wolled the ~ amrIl 
acquired its ~s. 'l'h~J grfIW ,.....1011, iwaensly ricl!.; and s(,~ becruae in 
tact, not only tbe land lm?da of ln4.. hut aleo ita ettonomio m.ut.ers. ~ 
to par] ir:ment and appointment to o£rice:e were dac1d.ed by'~ The sha1kh 
picked his oandidate., ensured their electicm, and controlled their pureea. 
S. A... Morrison sta~a. "in southam Iracu large land OWllGl"'S of Sb.o.1khs }?Os ... 
virtw:Uly all of the land.1f23 
The, 1D.f'l.'wmeial p~irlg t~ u::.'tlSll¥ ~ ~$rS o£ old .met 
noble !am1l1o. rus 'twa ot laDd lord i.s ~ an absentee oi.ty ~ .. 
who livea in l.'wm:ry and ~oe. and only viatts the land in harvea ~ to 
collect his ren1;. 'lhe POWEll" ot SOJiI!I& land lo1."df; is SUGll that they oan ~ the 
g~ am even im'ltlgate revolts wh10h a l"'e ditfieuJ.t to quell. '!'hey sup. 
port the gove~ so long a$ it proteots, t.beir asaendalcy aDd vested iP.t~" • 
at ' T~ Jm!:it¥ae!Rll 
'.i'he tOift'W blainessmen are a mnorit,. of to-reign trade ~t.) 
real estate ~ and industrie.llsts who live in tb,e main cities. Tbfq ~ 
leas .influential. than t he land ~. but l»l"e sooially ;j.ulv~~. ftd.s is dl:Ie 
to the tacrt. that, t.hey are monJ exposed to 'ii~ civ1.l.iHtian. 1'~ aJ"$ 
" .' I' 
indUf$l"ct to soeial reforms, and 1:0 t'b:i.s re&j;:tect tlley dUfer .i'l:'om the JJmd 
lords who usuall.y oppose 8o~1 r et'ol"lllS. 
B. ~ UYiiS.:,1 cu.sS 
.:::w;. ) .• * 
The lower ol.us consists of the i'a.rm&r8. beduina, .and tb.& ~ 
By We-stem meaa~t$ the ~ o£ living of t.b1II claes 18 de-
plorably low. The ga;p between i't as.d the upper c.l.as~l lYa$ and atill 1a $O~ 
tbl:.t those on the lowest lflTel could J1<,."'Ver hope to rise to A higher ~ .. 
1= ,.~ If!ii'B:E' 
The farmers tom t1'l9 b:lllt of the populat1cn. Th$f' are ~ ...... 
bee o:l settled tribelh 'the t al"mel"l1 are mostJ,' aha:te tem:w:Ate, tu1U'Va~ 
tbe l.uc.tI for the land lorde.. A$ a sll.u'e ~, a. ~ W no ~tr 
of t_1.ln on the S4"..me plot, O£~. He 1$ not cert.e.in of Kaep1ng t:b.e ltmd ara'l 
reefdrlng the fruitsoi: any' 1mprov~ta he might be abl~ to make by great. 
experience, or by invest:m.en.t ()f his av:ingz if any. 
The dapetldenoe of the :,t'a.rI38r on ~ land loXid is aaaplete,f ;::xnd in b1s 
, 
narrow and l.:bl:dted vision ~ :1rr~1$: ~ ~ bae an opportutd.'\y t-o . 
work and make & living other tbim to rewdn _ tbe larJd ~ besub~ to 
his maet.el". lie is ll"equently indebted to ·the latter ~ t4 a .grain lQQt"~ 
who clo.al.y ~ere:t.e. with the land lords. He is not only dependent aD b1s 
master econami~. but also soeiaUy and politieally. I£ arr:r dispute ~ . 
among the:r~$, they bay. to l."eSYrt to tJ:wi:r reudaJ. lords to _ttle tt. ::tJ.\ 
tif!ite ()f t.X"OUble aDd b.ard.fJh1p tbsr go to' h1m :tor ~ and ball'. Whea ... Il1II 
problem anse$ whilJh ~qu:1.r_ :.tnt,ervention 'II'i1th the g~t atbdniatnt,1on 
of the court., it can be settled only 'dth t.he land lord's help or through hU 
innuence. During a1eet.1ons, the f~r votes for his land lord tar ~ 
supported by h1s land lord. He does not ""te against h1m sinca the SG~ o£ 
the bal14t is not assured in practice, dthough 1t ie established 1n law. 
~., the ~ t~,t. 
Beduins form an importa.nt. part, 01 t.he pOpula.tion. The tr1bal ~ 
under Which tMyllve 1s ,EW'en mo1"e detrlmental to eoonomiClc ~'&; t.htm the 
feudal. qatem. Aa producers, the ~. p1q a vary ins~CBn'\ role in the 
natioDal eo~. As eon~e the beduins benefit the natiaaal econom;.y ft'I!7 
lit.tle. beGallSe of the meag$mess at tlla!:r l"&SOVces and the primitJ;V'e 8:bcpli-
city of their ille. fheir n~ ean be .met with til. 8IIIlll q'WU'ltlty of the .'- r 
eS'tt goode. farl~. the Beduins horiaon is ll.m1ted to his tr:Lbe. De lm01f8 
'no :fa:tbe~ and eannot tolente the Nst1"'ai:ata of Ii ~ state. It 111 of 
no oorurem t.o him Whet.ber he be 811 &aq1,a s,riaB, or a lejite. Nor i. be: 
both.pad by the tact that his ruJ..- _y be a ld.ng, a. d1otaWr, Qr the p~ 
ofa deaocrat1c republJ.e. ftbat OMoerns 'bbl is tenUs l.acd lIb..- he em'""", 
" 
hls"cat.tle and oamels to paa\ure. 1Id.ch st$.te _y hold the landis nO ',. ~ 
to him. He UDCleratands no of.fieial b~ie. and recognaes no color map. 
~ deecribea this si'huUon well; I1In the 7eu' 1$l52, .... aaona 'the Bed-
utmJ, still l.et!l.ding their hard, hungry sad unenv1ed li'fta, the visitor too 
their teut.. would f'illd evvy' scene and Q~c'e UlWbanged. for the'la8tt li .... 
or titty deoaQelh... Their extreme pOYe1"ty forbade them ,<J1.ly less pr1mi:t.ive 
liIUlteri.aJ. equipl'llim.t, snd their ~ organization and iaolAt.1on precluded &1.., 
lllOR ~ meaDe of cultural progress". 24 
J. ~ _see! 
The u.rban laborlng masses are eon£1ned to e1'Uu and big t.owa.a o~ .. 
Their stand&rd of living is by no lOOans better than. the reet ot the lower' 
elaa.. 'their -.gee I'll"e Tel,,:! low J and thay lead a life or cont.1:l'mal ~. 
for bare aubtd.stence.. Their income is not adequate to support the:1r ram; J 1_ 
which wm.'\Uy are lal"p in mu'llbor. As a remtlt of this. ebild labor lY1tb all 
or ita evils is a common pra.Qt1oe. altbough it 10 proh1bi~ by law .. lit. ~ 
durl gives a deaeriptlTEt picture of the moseS in ~J (tIn t.h.e c1tic$, the 
popula:t.i01'1 of ~<l 18 divided into the relatively small but 1Je&lthyolas., am 
too wretched and exploited ms.osee. ~o.f ~ or ~ ...... and 
still are,' without r...Ql1t;&, 14tbout. land. Ydt.ht:m't sebDolu, and wen without. ~ 
sonal ~y. ThEfy,1I'lIre constMtl7 t~~ by statYation $!1Cl ~e.'l2S 
Beoause of these COl1dit~ it tan be se.1.d with Si',IUa coaf'i~, that 
o.l.thcugh the 'ff'OJ:kerte conditions in 11£0 did oot ~ a c.lrastic che.np 
durla.g the last· thirty years ~ thq d1d b~ aware ot the1r social ~ eoano-
., 
ude e1t.uat1on. ~ is dUe to tba1r exposuie ase1ty dwell ... t.o ~ 01~ 
i$'t.icD, meehanlDt1on. industr:lal:lp.'Mc1, and political e;cUvitiu. Be .. _ 
of th1a awareness, coupled with d1sMtid\\etlCla-.i.:t.h the ~t. attitude 
of inattention tcmal'd t.hem, the urban labore!" be ~ tit 80"';:"'_ of headache to 
the authorl.t!es.. &lCit:Y!.1X"~ by poUtical parties, be ofi,en rtmllt.$d, struck, or 
24 .!!!B ~ !9.~. 38). 
as DID~l\ln' ~ 11. 
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or displayed signs of dissatisfaotion. "The rank and flle,iutterly negleoted, 
and despairing of any hope of improvement, !k'lve beoome a great source of unrest 
to the sJ.:isting regime in Iraq. l'bese masses have orten revolted in the past 
on various pretexts, suoh as religious differenoes and natiOlk1.lisID; but today 
they are attraoted by Communist propc:..ganda. The real cause of their unrest is 
their deplorable sooio-eoonomic oonditions. u26 
C. THE GROi,TH OF THE lllDd..E CLABS 
In between the v;e,:',lttv minority at the top and the poor majority at 
the bottom, there lies a small, but weak middle class oonsisting of salaried 
business employees, technicians following various skilled occupations, govern-
ment offioials of the lower grades, and members of the professions. This mid- 'i 
dle class does not fill the wide gap in the sooial structure and has very lit-
tle, but growing political power. However, it produces the intellectual and 
the progressive elements in the population. 
The middle class is in an early stage of emergence ~ beoause in a 
predominantly agricultural country, were f$U.tlalism has persisted for such a 
" 
long time, it is not possible to expeot a rapid rise of the middle class. How-
ever, for reasons which are mentioned below, the m:tddle class is gradually 
growing and exerting more influence on social and economic development. 
1. Education 
The growth of the riddle cla.ss accompanied the growth of education 
in Iraq. In 1920-21, Iraq had eighty-eight pr::tmary schools for both boys and 
26 Khadduri, INDEPENDENT IB.A~4, 12. 
21 
girls with 7,h,2 puri.1-s, whD.c the nUll'1~l" of mtudents in ths MCOJ;l4ary flohool.a 
was only ')~O. 'J:l In 194.9 .... 1950, th~ rrt.lmber 0:£ OtUdeIltS enroUed in all too 
schools of Iraq was 243,371..28 ;;:itatistics of Cll.J'lrfJ!lt educat.i.on .tacilitie8 
show that over ,300 ,000 yotU1.g peopltJ Were beL'1.g tautut in schools a.nd oo1...1..egea 
in 195.3.29 
Education ist!. decisive factor in shortoninllI the diBtance b~ 
the up;;er and lOl'{ar class. The c.."1araoteristios of the system ot educatian. :1a 
Iraq has a~.at deal to do nth. the mi6i1o class and its effort to bridge \.~ 
gap b€!t~e(0n t...he lover class and tilG ltPp« olass. The f'oll.owing are the cl1ar ... 
noteri6l\t.GS of' tho :Traqi syst~ of education: 
1) Education is free ;:J.t all lavels of study. 140~, in most high 
schools .. rocpeohlly tcc:''1Dica~ soooole, and in, most colleges,. room and boa..-d 
are :)l'ovided f"<.ri:he B tu.dents;dthout Orull'gO. 
2) Sta.n.drll .. ~tlon o.f entl""l requir~t.s tor el~tary schools berth 
pub11c awl private .. :r:lakc thOO'l. available for rich and poor alike. 
3) Students enjQY :ll:tpoJ:-ta."l.t ~lptiO%U; and priv*illg$8 in their 1!'.ili-
" 
tary sorvice oblien.tions, ,md. tM.s 10 c. motive -to attend schools. 
4} Bdllcati0n is clo::v~l:7 !'el.c.tied to economic opportunities. :~o..ltool 
29 lbiG,. 
-
'I 
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their families. 
2. 0kills 
Industrial development in Iraq has released dormant forces within 
i • 
the nation and 'opened new fields of opportunity for talents and energy. Mo-
dern industry, requiring skills whioh were unfamiliar to the people of Iraq 
now provides the middle class with a career outside the government service, 
the professions, or politics. Moreover, the competition ot the allied armies 
during the second liorld I~ar for a small group of skilled labor, induced a great 
number ot people to start learning new skUls because of the economic benetits 
that oould be derived from acquaintance with new technical skills. 700 train-
ing for these skills was mostly lion the jobn , but with inoreased demands for 
skills, new teahnioal schools were opened and the old ones were enlarged. In 
some speoial cases, e. g., in industries requiring highly skilled craftsman-
ship, an apprentioeship system was developed aided by finanoing and fa.oilities 
from the Wilistry of Education, Which not only provided for an apprentice t s 
education, but also contributed to his support whUe he was· being trained. 
. . 
A. GUILD SIS'l'Di 
. , 
Iraqian labor organizations oan be traced 'to unions which app~ 
L1t the encl· of the 1930"s. They wero trta prod'uct of bldit:lQl'l.S brought about 
by -t.he introduction of the factory system. Tbgy were by no means the dOH0l1d-
eat.s of t he ini'o~tl guilds 'Which ex1sted in Iraq during the last tour ieno~ 
tio.."ls" This was du~ to two l"tk"lBOllSt 1) they were exclu.ded ~ tabor Law 7! 
for 19)6 by the fo1.1mnng s~1.temen\J "Indust.ri.al undertakin:e does Mt incl.ude •• 
~y undertaking in which only the members of the !,,;mi.ly of tm, propnet.or of 
the undertaking are empl.OYed.~c)O 2) most of the :;uUds were 1'lGt aJ."r~ by 
the prooes.e of moderniza.tion which the factory syst.a.n brought about, either 
beeau::;e they were engaged. :i..n ~aoturing requirln~: h'iGh1y skilled ~ 
ship laS in t.he case of the sUver-s;;"~ ttl :1.ndustry, or 1IRn"e produm..ng a tn:>e· of 
merchandise to whi.oh modem ma.uu!aotu.ring ta~quEls are dif.fieult 'to apply, 
as in. the case of the eopper-SIlith induetl"'l'. t:be produets of md.ch are tt&0d 
only by the t rlbamoon or nom<"d •• 
The guild syJri:.em in Iraq differs £:rom the :ma~ uw.e.l.lT ~oo by 
this term. It is by no means rel.E\too to the -;;f!t.tel"ll Syst.em. Ita main ~ 
aaterlst10 is that it 1$ infol."m8;l" 'l"lle perioda for apprentice$,. jou:m~ 
and l'IlSstere are not de.f'ined. Tbe wage. are not f~ by the gulld., nnd the 
t f 
30 ~~ u.ti lJ2!t 11 ~ ~ (~ 1942), 2. 
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-individual contract is the common practice in fixing the w<~ges. The guilds 
are conducted in the mains, along traditional lines by closed communities. 
They are confined in most oases to highly skilled crafts. Each guild operates 
in a certain area of the city where all the members of that guild work. 
Handioraf'ts, for which Iraq has been famed through the ages, still 
form an important part of industrial produotion. Mosul, which used to be the 
center of ootton and rayon handloom industries ,still maintains its reputation 
although to a lesser degree. A number of fine industries have survived in Bag-
hdad; wood and metal oarving, the kettles of the coppersmiths, and the curious 
antimony-silver Amara work of the Sabeans. 
The Crai'tsman who have inherited the skill of generations are still 
using the same methods und tools used by their ancestors. To the craftsr.o.an, 
these things are more than a praotical necessity that-keeps them in usage; it 
is the reverenoe due to age and untiring workmanship. ,~hat the craftsmen lack 
in time-saving devices and modern tools is painfully evident. They work very 
hard with the dignity of an artist, and think "why should one discard what has 
'j 
been found good by one t s anoestor merely truit he may save one or two hours of 
time? II 
l'he secrets of the craft are guarded and the p<?st mast-ers of the 
guilds were more than finished workmen; they were priests with a formal code 
and sense of personal importanoe, and so is the case with their successors. 
No where else in the world are crafts more a IM.tter of race and in-
heritance than in Iraq. The son follows the trade of his fathers. The father 
s~J.ves the cost of a helper in the apprenticeship of his son. Every fa.r.:ily is 
32 
z;:ocialized in dOirlg one tl.inZ. :For (3.?:rurrple 1."1 the dyill[; indu~ there is the 
br(Ytm-dying f&1:ily J the member of this fa.."lli.ly lmol;:fs just how ttl€! various ~ 
eoctions '.It ba:::'k,s ~ heros and llhatnot chould be 11:ing10d to produce the rich 
blu.e-dying family f.,tAy be next door. It is strictly ane-fal':lily ;,i.!fair. 
Un!ortunato~, th.crc 2.l10 no .:rt.atistics available which reve~'tl the 
perccnt[~ge of workers 'omo arc engaged in these sk:Uled era-fit>. 11owevcl" they 
B. 'tHE 'ACTOR! f,IS'1'iti 
Iraqi acquaintanoe 1d.th the factory system i.e rather reoent. Some of 
the cause. tflr this industrial. lag r8.t with the Iraqian society itself J other. 
lie at the doors of toreign interests. The IraqiSns laoked the man.apri.al 
skill. the 1a1t1ative. and the training t.-r 1nduatr1al enterprise. l'b.ey pre-
tered to invefri; their capital in l.a.nd, a secure inTeBtmentJ rather tba:n TeJ'1t,lU"fj 
ato unfamiliar tielda where foreign oompet,ition .. st:rrmg. Foreign cap1\al, 
which tlowed into Iraq after the .tire' ~ .. of the tWeDti8th cent.'W:."7" .. 
not irmurted in :industry because European capitalists did not want to produce 
< 
-competition 1'Iith their heme eeoncm!.es. Foretp 1nvest.Dlent oapiW t0un4 a,m... 
pl. and profitable investment opportunities in mortpge banld.ng, tranfJportat~ 
and financing the rapidly growing foreign Vade. The only eueptlon to t.hi8 
trend 88 the petrolaun industry. As a reault. of the .. conditions, lltOde:rn in-
dustry _s sJ.ow to appear. There was no modern aanufacturing in t he twen:\1e. J 
although various po_ibllitles were often diseu8Sed. The petrol.e'tllln 1ndustJ!'y't 
h01f'&Yer, the future 8OUl"ee o£ the oO'tll'ltlTts greatest single eaterpriH and 
" 
wealth, adYuced dving these ;years trGm the' ooaterence room into t he open. 
'lbe pvernment'a irKhlstrial exhibition at IIagbdad, in 19)2, indicated 
production in QxU.y at .. industries. fbere bad been lHal dev~ of e1-
eet.:r1c power, Mllhanized brtck....udllf.h two s;1nnerie. far aot.t.on, two· .001 
m:Ul.e,8ID8ll cigarette i'aet.ori$s, soap factories, and a tanner.r-
A oement facrtory ~s long projected, and in 1932 a canoes.ion 1I&S 
grant.ed to a group of cit!.sens. Plana...-.re m.ade for a shoe factory, a fruit 
cardling plant, and dat",sugar production. OU export. d1.d not ~e untU 
I' 
"I 
I 
I: 
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late in 1934. 
The years !rom 1932 t.o 1934 produoed little more industrial develop-
ment. One or t.wo small f:aotories were enlarpci. more small cigarette fa:otol"ies 
and mechanised brick kilns were established. ioe and soda .factories (soi"t 
-
drinks 1ndustry) came into existence. a. third oottonginnery was planned, and 
fa.otories .for the making of eonfeotionaries and matches were established. A 
date packing industry is Basrah oonsisted or two factories J one British a nd 
Al.lterican, and the other lraqian. On the other band the oU develo}:ment durillg 
theae years progressed rapidly. 
During the aecomiWorld Wart the deairs £01" industrial exp;a.ns1on 1lIaS 
shortages and an ine-roomed labor mat"k.$"t. In spit. ot £actors like the shortage 
of raw materials. oompaUtion for akilled workers, .and the 1nlpos8ibllit:r ot im-
porting faotory equipment, the Il\lJlI)sr of modern factories reached swonty by 
1944. 
.By Jdd-oentUl"Y J the observer of: Iraq :1J.ldUtrt:r1al d~ could 
SM rapid industrial expa,naion. 'fbis rapid progress _s & result of the di .... 
" 
appearing ot the war-tw limitations and liav~ coouragemant. and prot .... 
tion ot 1ndu.striea. The emplasis WaS on induatri.es using Iraqi raw matsria1s 
in order to diminish the need for i.lapons,and included the manu!&eturing of 
cement, soap, alcohol, vtlgete.bl.e oll. leather and shoes, oiga.r~ttG$, b.,.·, and 
textUas. 
!!'!!. Develo~t Board, established to 5Upervise part of the use ot 
oil royalties, devoted considerable e.z;pood1tures to industrial !ll'id !'!dning :lebo-
Most of its projects. lete by the 
~~\S TDWE:"~ ;(~ ~ 
,v lCl'YOI.A 
L!r-IIV~RSnY 
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end of 1956. 
&y 19>7, the number of industrial establishments in Iraq reached 
22,500 and employed lOO,O(X) workers.)l 
C. LEVt:.LOf-U.:ENT OF LABOt\ OaGANIZATIOflS 
The following factors promoted the initiation of unions in Iraq: 
1. The exposure to liestern industrialization. 
Unionism is a natural concomitant of industrialization. IraqIs ex-
posure to ~'iestern industrialization affected the urban v/orkers, for with this 
method of economic organization came the associated .. estern social grouping of 
trade unions. Official concern for labor began to be felt in the 1930' s when 
industrialization was started in order to strengthen the Iraqi economy'. 
2, The contribution of the Internationa~ Labor Organization. 
One of the direct consequences of the involvement of Iraq in the con-
ferences of the International Labor Organization, was the growing consciousness 
of the importance of formulating a labor policy conoerning their recognition 
of unionism. This interest of Iraq in lab:>r affairs on the international le-
" 
vel was due to the fact that Iraq as a nation which recently emerged on the 
stage of the world, wanted to follow the footsteps of other new nations in 
their attempts to prove to the world their actual existence. 
Iraq as a member of ~he International Labor Organizations, benefited 
a great deal from this membership, for many times it Hdopted recommendations 
and proposals of the International Labor Organization conventions. 
l' .loIs :;:11 shows the international agreeme..'1te which have been approved by the 
Iraqi gmr~"'llJ:ilCl'lt. 
110.. and. cia te o! 
~hG . a1FeemeniE , 
No. 18 £or 1925 
No. 1.9 ffYl." 1925 
No. 11.1 for 19.34 
No. 58 tor 19)6 
TABLE II! 
llflE.'tlL1.'I'IO:1AL LABOa AGftJ.h~'i?;; Al'1'lWViD 
BY fi~GOVErur~~ 01 IRAQ 
S,ubJect of a~~~\ 
Th!lr~ law lfhicJ1J2'" p~ e 9:E!!!!l' 
Workers eampeu.sation La.:w l~o. 20 for 1931 
fot' ··work illness 
Polie.r ~ith foreign 
labor 
La .. !jo. 6 tor 1940 
Women night 'WOrk Law No. 11 for 19.37 
JUnimum working a.ge Law No. 7 tor l.938 
SourOGIAbstra.cted !rom Ira.qi labor laws noted, below. 
Iraq t S eolltr,;i..b'U.tioI~ to the Intenut10nal Labor offioe, und lltera-
ture published by that group <i'..u-ing the 1920'$, led to some efforts to pJXXiU$8 
., 
~ 
su.itable labor legis.l.:ltion. E.illce alnIost no facrl;orie~ had as yet been e$~ 
lished in Iraq, ho~ar. mul~ criteria and :i>"t,atldarda were 1arg'1y inappl.1-
Gable. the. first oeeds at social :Ult.ar0st ill labor matt.61·s were 301m. 
The P"" "sage into law oJ.' a labor code :in 1936 Ie refiectQd. presSUl·e on 
the gove...~ t.o initiate, at loo.st Gstalls:lbly, something resembJ.:1.ng modem 
standards in the treatXi1:ent of industri.'J.l workers .. although the aot for the 
J.r1OCllcnt had little practicala:ttect. It did, ho,vever j recognize by law the 
right of wo~,ors to organize. 
In 1940, two developments were evident. On the one hand, there were 
attempts within the ranks of labor for widespread organization. On the other 
hand, government policy was, fuller development of trade unionism. As a re-
sult, several unions came into existence. Of these the YiiOst important ones 
wero those of the Railway Workers, and the Iraq petroleum Comp<'my's workers. 
This hopeful situation lasted for only one year, for the government 
which had come into office after the coup d'etat in 1941, dissolved the ex-
isting trade unions. "In economically undeveloped Iraq •••• trades-unionism is 
weale; except in the Iraq Petroleum Company and in the State ll.nilways; it was 
until recently officially discouraged by the governments that succeeded the 
" 
ffiilitary PutsCh of 1941".32 
The governments following the cOUp d'etat of 19h1, permitted union 
organization again. 
• The year 1944 w.?s the L10st important year in the hiStory of Iraq 
unionism. 'rhe amending law passed in 1942, to the labor code of 1936, began 
to bear fruit. It provided for improved conditions for women workers, the pro-
hibition of ohUd labor, paid holidays, oompensations for injuries, and arbi-
tration of labor disputes. A numbar of hopeful trade unions were organized. 
including those of the weavers, show-makers, masons, cigarette :makers. Basrah 
port worker~, and a number of less important industries. Their total member-
ship in those days reached seven-thousand workers. This figure represents 
roughly ten per cent of the labor force in Iraq in those dc'lys. 
32 Kirk, SHOaT HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST, 256 
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D. THE DZJ;]:dB OF THE mlIONS 
The labor movement, however, having no political ideology of its own, 
stood in a welter of confusion between the conflicting ideologies coming from 
abroad, and spokesoerl of the existing political parties. It was tempting for 
labor t.o tra'lJ'el along the rrod leading toward cOlumunism, which presented it-
self as a tempting solution to Iraq's deplorable social and eoouomic condition. 
Th's new ideology captured the imagination of the workers with its promises of 
a brighter future. It is true that the workers did not grasp even the w.ost 
elementary principles of this doctrine, but they were assured by oo~~ist 
propaganda. that in Marx's words, they had "nothing to lose but their cha:tns. 1I 
Although politica.l activities of the uni::lns invari.a.bly provod to be 
of no help to their cause, unions cClltinued to follow tl:d.s <D ursa of action 
hoping to find effeotive political methods. Their involvement in politics 
became deeper and deeper through the years.. until it r&.ched the point that, 
" •••• labor, . both union and non-union was always in the forefront of the nation-
al etruggle. II)) 
Another factor also caused labor to become deeply involved in poli-
tics. Libere.l and moderate non-union groups, fT".lstrated in their efforts to 
seoure enough support from a weak middle class, gradually began to think that 
their political future would depend on gaining the support of the lower cluss 
or working o.lass. As a result, the oonditione of the workers were used as 
slogans by the liberal groups and oertain opportunists, to champion their 
33 Nabih Amin Faris 3!ld frloha.n.n:1oo Tawfik Husayn, ~ Cr~::SCE1;T 1!l 
c.u::a,c" Lawrenoe, Kansas I 1955, ;a. 
fl,"I'Oll}lS I Bt,;,;.ged a .sar-le~ of strike,;; imd induJ.t;ed ir .. national agi"i;.ation. 
'n.c .tir.et strlke,"",,::; ot the ltai.l;iju;. ;iorke:ra t Unic)!l. in 1.945. ItA 
railw~ly-Wol"kar5 f strike :i.ll April 1945 ~:'lded onl;y~it:l hQB.ii·y-han.d6dsuppression 
of woI"kers and union alike. H34 imother c:tr:lJC0 r:hox"tly :;.,i't.er the r;dlw.ay work-
!il'kJ1~ strike ot 3 Jq 1946Jc al:c.hou.\;;h J:ully e;;<rloitt::d 'iJj th0 c(Jii.'li~tUlJ.i'St8, was 
in t.he main the result of t.he b<.:;.d. po;;;t ... WiIir cool1o~;,ic coni.it:i.ons. "~JB;:;)! 
S{orkeJ."'s of the Iraq Pe-tro10u;.l (;omf>a:i:~Y" tl~ough cOllsidel'C1C. i'aJ ..... 1) good, had not 
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.ihen the workers' denlaIlds for an increase of wages and the formation of a 
trade union were not conceded, they struck and denounced their employers as 
• imperialist exploiters'. On 14 July, 'When the 30()O workel's appeared to have 
seen no tangible results of their strike and were about to return to wcrk, the 
Iraqi police fired into a demonetration of about 400 workers, killing five to 
eight persons. u3.5 The belligerent method in which the strike was settled, pro-
voked extreme discontent and criticisITl among the people in Iraq. In order to 
mitigate the situation, the company raised the w'ages, <:md added medical facil-
ities, but allowed only a company union. 
As a result of these failures, the leaves of unionism started falling 
one after t,he other, as the falling of the leaves of trees in autumn" but the 
difference was that the leaves of unions were falling in the spring of their 
youth. 
After 1944, the strongest unions, those of the Railway \,orkers, and 
the Basrah port workers disinteerated. The following years were marked by 
other unions disappearinG due to their political a.ctivities, which the commun-
• 
... . 
ists and political porties exploited for their own interests. 
Hy 1950, trade unions appeared to be strong only ::tl'J.ong the cigarette 
;vorkers and textiles. There was also some union activity in the transport, 
building, and shoe Uk~u!acturing D1dust~ies. 
~. GOVERN1fENT OPFOSITION 
By the ye'.l.r 1954, union activity had become so deeply involved in 
35 274 
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polities and polit.ical unrest, that thegover.maent one$ again took meas'Ill'eS to 
eHminFl.te unions. These m.eatrU%'e followed two methods. The first method was 
through. legislations, and the second was :resorting to force. The tollo:wing is 
a revue of the legislative and foroe measures '\If'hereby unions '¥teN e1:i..m.inated. 
In its early relationship vd.th unions, the ~nt u.t3Eld legislati. 
on a.s a means to limit the $COp:e of union activities. With the pas saga o£the 
J,ab.oi," La" No.. 72 in 19.36, the WOll'kera were allowed to rom unions and ba'rga.1n 
eo1l&etivel.y. But t.he act was limited in scope. It placed the unioms unda:r 
strict governnwnt supervision, and excluded from its provisions large eecti~ 
of workers. It prohibited the !'onns.tion ot 2. general federation of labor. 
Acoording to this la., the Unions could &8t up lmder oertain conditions only" 
and only with the g1v.~nt.s approval. l11e gov~t had to appnwe the 
constitutim and by-laws. and aoul.d d1smis~.:; the union's executive committee. 
The council of ministers could cancel a union t s permit if a tmion endang.end 
the safety of the state, or handlad its a.ctivities in & man.~ar which would 
thre;3.ten the publl0 security. 
During the four or five years Wilid'l follavred the p,a.8sage '0£ this 
law, the gove~ met the ()bjection~ which \\fGre made to its limitations bT 
saying that liberal labor legislation would impose an in~oleI'&ble strain on 
.. 
the still Want industry. But the expansion of ind:ustl"'Y d:ur:i.ng and a.fter 
the second j'$Orld War, and the increa.sed demand tor workers during the war. 
i..ntproved the bargaining pOW'er of the unions. and their demands for more .f'ree-
dara in ma.naging their own affa.irs became mol' insistent. 'l'he1J. demand. con-
st.itueed a. new challenge for the government. whioh could not be met by stioking 
-. 
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to the old arguman~. 
, 11th eneouragement b j' politicians" labor damEillds bet,"al'l tald .. r.g the 
Slk'lpe of strikes. The gover.nment with no desire to lzke chmgos in t.b.e exis-
ting legialation, start-cd usi:ng the methods of force in doalinij with union c-. 
rest. f'olice measures 'I\'er& used in d~eJ.ing w.1:1ih new tbrea~g situQ.tions. 
The unions were severly oppressed. and thoir leaders were arresWd f<.lld pUlli$~ 
cd. Mnny cafrWllties result.ed from the clashes between 'polic& and stri.kers. 
The unions 'Wt.J.oh engaged in strikes liere dissolved. 
On August. 22, 1954, in (>rOOl' t,o save it&.ell tlOrB trouble, the g~ 
ment de.cid6d to diuol've all remainir1i unions. It islJ'W'j(i 011 that date th6 
ftGeneral A$sooia.;t1ous IteiUletiqpl1. l'his regulation etatfJd that aU ~ e.xi .... I 
ting unions \'i1U"'S to be dissolved for l"e<ii.sons cot'Ulected with't.M eafet.y of, t..he 
e0U11tI7.J6 . 
-A..tter dissolving ill unions ~n 1954, the gove~t throUJih the 
~ o,! Social Affaire looked aJ.'ter t?- interests of workers, 1t.s aot,1ona 
h~ve been principally to initiate housing -. s~, and to pl""OVide a aocie.l 
security law. 
CHAFTER V 
Unionism in Iraq, althou[:th a recent development and as yet limited 
in scope, tms neverthe1ells made i tl!l Iliar'.<: upon the conditions of labor in Iraq • 
• 1hat has been leaned in Iraq .from its experience with unionism so far might be 
Stmllllarized as follows. 
1. Between 70% aIld 80% of the toW population of Ira.q is still en-
gaged in agrioultur91 and is thus an unlikely pro-rspect for union mertlbership. 
Trade unioro.SlJl has alway"5 de\~eloped elmrly in scattered. mainly agricultural 
cormnunties, on a.ccount of the natural difficulties of ap}:;l;ying unionism to 
agricultural workers. There tends to be only a limited ntmlber employed on alJ'3' 
one farm, and long distances must be traveled to attend union m.eetings. ~re­
over j a v-el"'Y su.b:5tantla1 pi"oportion of those who work (Xl the land ~ ehare 
tenants, eo the 'Wage earn1.ng agrieul.tural ~rke:rs BrQ M"tually 8. millori ty amana 
those mo gain their 1:t:¥"' ••. n(t i"rol'l. the land. ~"'urtherrn.ore, tho~e lIbo are erxp1or-
eas tend to work on 8. ae&sonal basls. 
2. Deapi te the former 1nfilltmCG of the old i,iYs'tem of guilds, it 
I 
W~B the pra.ctice in more reoent years tor' s:1ployers and workers in industl"y to 
regulate their rclutlonships by means of individu..1.l contracts. The idea. of 
regulating their reJ.,:~t1onships by lll8nns of collective bargaining made little 
headsy ~lgainst the individual contract. 
3. The period of growtll of the young trs,d6 ubion mQV$ment I oo1neided 
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with periods of politioal changes. ~ unions d:tsaPP6,c;.red completely as a 
result of changes in government. 
4. The leaders :in mm:;,y respects were iIlexper'ienoed in the art at 
establishing and operat.ing trade unions. 
s. fypiea11y, th~ labor unil"Jn in Iraq 1mS Slnall in membership" ThiI 
did not allow th~ union to a.ccumul0.te I1mOUgh ~)o'i\<'W.'lr t09xert p~S't1l":.. on tht 
employer. 
B. S~ 01 lADOB. LA:~ 
• 1 , • 
Although the \len;eral !!soaia¥-ons Re~tj.qf1 of 195i.il emspended all 
union act.ivity, the constitution and laws of Iraq,. 'Without this murp.erudoD. do 
Qontain a basis for union organization; and in the fUture might enable Iraq 
to progress in this important phase of the 1.1.fe of a mo-dern nation. The roll .. 
oWin!: iR a ~ or the principal provision or e:x.ist1ne lP.oor laWs. 
1. Px:eadom oJ: a8S,~~0;!H-Provial.orls gtUlrentoo:L~g freedom of q... 
soc.i.:a.tion have been included in the constitution of Iraq. The Organio lnw of 
21 March 1925, one o:t the te;:ts fontd.ng the.. baeis of the Iraqi eonstlt.ution, 
• 
gnarantees freedom ot meeting cm.d of forming and joining assoc:t&tions within 
the limits prescribed by law. Specific p-rovisiol1o gunranteeing the nsh:t of 
indiTid'l.lals to combine for oocupatioDill purposes, are contained in. Labor Law 
No. 72 for 1936. 
2. ~cl~ ~rkerau-The l"igbt. of at't50oiation is extendeci to work-
er. 'flho are defined in Iraq labor law as porfS01'...5 eu:lployed in industrial und$*-
·takings; but. speo.i:fioo.lly excludes particulu.r categories :from the right, to t~ 
a union. The labor laws of Ir~q 40, DOt &'pply to undertakings in 'Which only 
metlbers of the proprietor's f'BJ\c'tUy e.ra employed.. Also, t,,.'lJ.e labor law of Iraq 
exclude Ilgrimutural wor!1:ars from ita operation. 
3. Eouil treatment :-Industrie.l ~tol"kGrs employed by the govel"Il!llent .... .. 
:0 are treated no differently under t.he 13001" laJr than other 'IWOl"'kere. 
1,. Formntion or a u..'I1iout-The right o£ OCCUl'~".tional association. con.. 
It, U ••• r 
tarred is lir~ted by the provisions of hw. '1'h:ta limit.etion t.akes the form of 
the requirEm.lent of prior authorization for the establishment of an oc~1at.ional 
organic;at1on.. 'l1Hl persons forming or joining trade unions l'A'USt normally be 
addressed t,o the UinistrJ ot Sooial Affairs, accompanied by the oonstitut:ton 
}nd l"'l.1.1es, names, and 13ldcwasllles of the organizers. The aom:pe~~ lll1ni::.rwr 
,lcaeptS,. rejects, or ~s the a.pplication wi thin fifteen days of the reeeip~ 
of the application. In case of rejection, the final deaisiol rests ~1t.h the 
Cou.ncil of' Ministers. It is not pOfwible to appeal a rejeetionthro\lgh the 
trade unions isdofined in the 11. 11' as 1- the aelense 1 proteotioo or promotion ot 
the oeoupaticnal interests of their members. Various welfare and sooial a,et".... 
ivi't.1es are alBo specified as proper to trade union activity.; *tr &'lm{>1e, the 
establisbment of mutual assistanoe funds and cooperatives. 'l"he unione of Iraq 
are to oontribute to the spreadtng of a st1iri t of 4'It>-opel"'ation.. and to industr-
ial developmbt1t. 
6. [)usrensiol1 or dissolution of unions :-Apart 11'014 the question of 
volunt/'U""'J d:tosolution, the law oonta:tnc-5 provisions in vf!.r-louscil"eum~t&'lces 
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relating to the involunta.ry suspension or dissolution of trade unions. Arti-
cle 28 of the Labor Law of 1936, states; tlIn the event of it being proved 
that an association is conducting its affairs in a Jl~anner which would lead to a 
breach of the public security or the safety of tbe state or what would lead to 
the prejudice of the interest of the work and the proper performance thereot, 
the Council of Ministers may at the request of the 1linistel" of the Interior, 
cancel the permit. rI 
7. 0upervision of unions:--The government of Iraq exercises a degree 
ot control and supervision over trade unions. Unions in Iraq are sulyiect to 
_OJ 
inspection by the competent minister. ::.>upervision is ax:erch.et~ .-.-:i.th' r0t~i..:rd to 
trade union meetings, records, and finances. The i'irbt general meeting ot a 
union to elect its executive committee is supervised by a representative ot 
the corr;petent minister. 
8. Determination of wages and fixing hours of work:--The traditional 
method of fixing vmges and other conditions of employment is the individual 
contra-ct. I .... or this reason, following th~ example many ,·estern countries :in 
similar circumstances, the government has a mini.mut'1 wage fixing machinery, 
which to a greater or lesser degree is a device which may be considered as a 
curtailment of freedom to l-oake individual and collective bf'.rgaining contracts. 
The labor law of Iraq gives the goveI'lllllellt power to I:rescribe mi nj mum wages for 
any trade. According to the Minimum ~Vages Regulation for "orkers No. 34 for 
1953, Article I. \I ••• the minimum daily payable to: 
(a) The unskilled workman aged 16 years and over is 2;0 Fils (72¢) 
(b) The young person (Murabiq) aged 12 to 15 years is 180 1<'i15 (;O¢) 
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At the present time the Ministry of Social Affairs, through the 
Council of Ministers, fixes the llffiges of Y'ort and railway workers. The Minis-
try of \.looial Affairs also fixes the daily wages for children; "1'1-:.:: :',cttf.l of 
daily wages for children between 10 and 12 years of age shall iWt. 'i),: less than 
40 per cent of the wages paid to adult 'tmrkers in all industrial undertak-
ing."37 'I'P..e daily hours of work for all industrial undertakings according to 
the notification of the Ministry of Interior are eight hours a day, with the 
exception of construction workers, carpentry, and the we.."lving industry, wnere 
the daily hours are nine. 
9. Collective bargaipingt-Under the Iraqi labor law, trade unions 
may oonolude collective bargaining agreements. However, there 'were hardly any 
unions that became strong enough to secure oollecti ve agreements in Iraq. 
10. Settlement of labor disputes:--According to Regulation No. 63 
fC'r 1954, a labor dispute is defined as: " •••• any dispute between an employer 
and five or more workmen concerning work of conditions of employment." The 
Labor U1W of Iraq No. J6 for 1942, makes provisions for the issue ~f special 
regulations for settlement of industrial disputes, but no such regulations 
have yet been issued. In practice the Ministry of Social Affairs seeks to aot 
as a mediator in any dispute that may arise. The Minister of ~ociaJ. Affairs 
endeavors to settle the reported dispute by conciliation. In case the dispute 
is not settled by conciliation, the Minister refers the dispute for settlement 
37 MINISTRY.Qf SOCIAL AFFAIR.;) NOTIFICATION 1.&. 119.E ~. 
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to a. Board of Arbitration appointed by the L~n15ter and consisting of one or 
more persons nominated by the empl~er, and an equal number of persons nomin-
a ted by the workers. The decision of the Board of Arbitrators i8 final and 
enforceable. 
11. Strikes :-1\8 far as the question of strikes is concerned, the 
Labor Law of Iraq contains no specific proviSion prohibiting strikes. A trade 
union may be dissolved if it is oonducting its affairs so as to, IIprejudice the 
work or the proper performance thereoi'.n38 Under the Maintenance of Publio 
Peaoe Law of 19:52, all sympathy strikes are considered illegal, an{i when a 
strike involves a danger that it will lead to a disturbance of the publio 
peaoe, a hindrance of transportation or oessation of supplies in general, 
the government authorities r11:.1.y designate the strike as an "extraordinaryll 
strike, and thereafter any person deemed IIdangerous tl by the authorities may be 
assigned a compulsory residence, or forced to cease to reside in w~ speoific 
place or places. 
12. Collaborationbetw~en public authorities and union~No actual 
maohinery exists at present for collaboration at the national level. The la-
bor law provides that worker's associations, llmay offer guidance faoilitating 
the application of the law, "39 and provides also for the establishment of gen-
eral employL~t agencies, empowering the government to set up tripartite oom-
ndttees for consultation on matters affecting the administration of such 
38 LtJ30J. ~ l!Q. 1Z. lQfi 12..'32, Article 28. 
39 Ibid., [,rticle 23. 
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agencies. ;";0 far, no such comIUittees appeD,r to have been established. Col-
laboration at the indm;try and undertaking level is little developed. A joint 
committee is understood to exist for the oll industry. There are no \iork 
Councils in Iraq. 
C. CONCLUGION3 
Npwadays J if a person l.1akes a comparison between the three groups 
which oompose the lower class; the farmers, the nomads, and the urban workers, 
he must reaehl:,he conclusion that the nomads and the rural workers are lag-
ging far behind the urban workers as far as their social ;md economic status 
are concerned. It is true that many factors worked ·together in favor of the 
urban workers and helped to Fut them i.ll a position ahead of the nomads and the 
farmers. The mere fact that urban workers are living in the cities Il'lade it. 
possible for them to be affecteo more during the last thirty years, by the pro-
cesses of modernizations, nlecrumization and industrialization than the other 
two groups. Moreover, they ha.ve the direct concern of p;)litioians, being 
closer to them. This puts the pressure Oll the government to discuss their 
" 
~ 
affairs and occasionally produoes some reforms. But what wns the role of un-
i onism in this development? 
Unions played an indispensible role in the career of the workers. 
They developed a sense of solidarity among the workinS class. They made it 
possible for them to' gain a tee ling of importance, of sooial entity, and a 
sense of belonging. They increased their knowledge of their own problems and 
the world around thera.. This GrOwing self-consciousnes£:was shown a rights-of-
devoted to its interests, 
'workmen movement in 19J~4, which de."lla.nded a newspaper 
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an insurance Byf:>'tem, and a wage-arbitration board. 
The Iraqian worker today no longer puts his thumb print on any paper 
that is offered to him. He reads, disousses, and makes suggestions, and is 
not prepared to aooept anything unless he is oonvinced that it is right. 
The short life period of Wlionism in Iraq was due to a large degree 
to the politioal situation both national and internationEu. It VE:LS difficult 
for labor, whioh was largely unorganized, to exert any pressure in order to in-
fluenoe the price and wage polioies of the emplqyers. The efforts of the in-
fant labor unions in this respect proved to be ho·pelese. Moreover, vdth the 
absence of' a labor party and a genuine labor spokesman in the parliament, there 
was no way to· check the powerful landlords vlhioh dominated parlimuent and oppo-
sed progressive labor legislation for fear it mir,ht extend tlO rural workers. 
This ·thesis has shown that Ira.q bas but recently emerged :from the 
colonial status :lnto the responsibilities of politio,J. independence. As a re-
suIt of this, the practice of democracy is still in its early stages and lea-
ves muoh to be desired. 'rhe government administration and political ai'i'airs ie 
" 
prevalent. Moreover, as a result of the semi-feudal social struoture, the 
government is controlled by the landlords. In their narrow aI1,d limited 
outlook the landlords think that any sooial reform is nothing but a dDngerous 
threat to their wealth and power. Jocial reform leans to enlightenment 'which 
means a demand for improv~nent. The result of lxiprovement is a better stand-
ard of livin~, which in turn means redistribution of "fealth, and this is out 
of tIle question as ftir as the landlord is concerned. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to find the road of union progres:3 blocked by government opposition 
Turning to the issue of communist influence in Iraq, there ax-a ap-
parently a number of misconceptions in respect to Iraq unionism in its rela-
tlouships with communism. Gome writers and historians on local and inter-
national levels apparently view the labor lllOVea.neIlt in Iraq as part of tt com-
munist movement, attribute all labor activities to communism, and say all str-
ikes were organized only for political reasons. One historian writes: "Com-
munism played its part in evsr<J strike ... tl40 , and in anothor place he writes: 
1I •••• examples were thenceforward to be frequent of the organ:i.zation of the 
strikes among workers for political pur'Poses 'With lit tIe regard to their ac-
tual grievances.1t4l Another historian states; "Organized urban labor has 
natural ideological affinities vdth the Russian syBtem. n42 
It was declared on many occasions by the governments who succeeded 
in office, that unions are fertile soil for communism and in encouraging unions 
we are inviting communism to our country. Others went to the faxtrer.w of using 
terms cammmism and unionism interchangeable. These oritical judgments are far 
from the truth and are obviously being made without resorting to sqient1fic 
~ 
researoh. It is a universal fact tl~t communists always fish in troubled 
waters. They are always ready to interfere "menever the opportunity presents 
itself in the form of social, economical, or political maladjustment. Such an 
opportunity 1mS availa.ble in the case of labor in Iraq. Naturally the Comtmm-
40 Longrigg, IRAQ 1200 l'.Q 1950, 35,3. 
41 Ibid., 312. 
1 2 VA -k C'Ht'>DT IJ-rC'i'On-y OF T'P":;> IrTDDL':" li',~t'T <)("8 
",1 l~~, t..,)+~':!l.;'- .. v Il. ___ ~ ~\i.L.t 4"~ ' '".) • 
51 
starting working on this case, and they did achieve a dE.~gree of success ',duoh 
enabled them to penetrate into the labor UlOV011.l6nt. However, this success was 
not enough to control unions and their activities and to label unions with red. 
::"0) if the labor cause was exploitee by communists and politioal manipulators, 
no one can take the freedom to say that the labor lIlOvement is a communist move-
ment, and if unions conducted strikes as a la:3t ref.ort to achieve their 6ou1s, 
that does not necessarily mean they are communist. It can be surtnised with 
oon.fidence that tho main reason for labor unrest in Iraq is the inadequate 
social and economic conditions of life. 
One must draw the conclusion tl'l8.t the attitude of the present gov-
ernment of Iraq toward unions, rather than discouraging communist influence, 
inotead only encourages oommunist activities. The goyernment oontrolled prin-
cipally by la.rge land owners, and ~ai1ing to carry out reforms to benefit the 
people of Iraq as a whole forces the kind of sooial and political unrest upon 
w'hich oommunist agitation thrives. It iB an attempt to hide the shortcomings 
of the present government to blame all unrest and agita.t.ion upon th~ communists 
The true solution to the problem is to remove its causes which are depressed 
and unjust economic condition, and thus avoid its effects. 
The people of Iraq are fir6t of a.ll Iraqis, and lastly desirous of 
being a part of a foreign ideology ::mch as commmism. Corro:::;.unism rueS merely 
concentrated t:'lore than other foreign ideologies upon eA'T,loiting the failings, 
weaknesses, and corruption already existing I'l'ithin the country. It thus often 
appears stronger, and sometimes eventually becomes stronger, that ot:ber for-
eign ideologies better intentioned but less skillful at 8Xj:)loiting a countr'J's 
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weaknesses. 
D. THE FUTURE OF UNIONISM IN IRAQ 
- - -
It may be interesting to speculate on what the future has in store 
for unionism. in Iraq. 
Today there are no unions in Iraq, and the government is in charge 0 
labor affairs. In its efforts as a substitute for unions, the government is 
trying very hard to fill the vaouu,n which is left by the absense of unions, by 
inaugurating a series of labor reforms. The first among these und the lliOst 
important vms the passage of the Social Security L<1w No. 27 for 1956. This 1£1 
provides for the following benefitsa 
Old age benefit 
Perman~nt invalidity benefit. 
Survivors benefit. 
Marriage benefit. 
Maternity benefit. 
Death benefit (funeral, burial, shroud). 
Sickness benefit. 
Unemployment benefit. 
Although this law provides limited financial aSSistance, it can 
still be considered a good step toward social reforms. 
. '. 
ConSidering its recent 
passage, its effect is still to be seen. Another reform wbich is worthwhile 
to mention is the establishment of the labor court early in 1957 to doal with 
labor disputes. Other plans which are on the list of the Uinistry of Social 
Affairs are: a. new labor law, est.:1.blishment of runployment agencies, and a 
plan for technical traiping centers. 
;'iith all these recent government a.ttempts to better the conditions 
of labor, the question arises, how far is the government a success.fu1 substi-
tute for unions? It is difficult to give a def:inite answer, because freedom ot 
a.ssociation is not in practice today where unions CM operate, so a cOl'nparison 
cannot be made. Also, because of the occasional existence 0;:' ::iUrtial law, it 
is dir.ficult to tell pr'eciselywhat the reaction is of the workers in their 
choice between the government and the unions. l'hey are afI'2.id to state their 
opinions. 
My opinion in this respect is that the present situation cannot en-
dure for a long time, .and the government cannot take the plt\ce of the unions, 
because on the one hand, the government dON; not provide for the workers a 
sense of belonging or a feeling of iJ;-:portance as j.n the case of the union. On 
the other hand, the worker'tl llitter e.x:perience with tho government in the past, 
has caused the government to be looked upon by the workers nth suspicion and 
nd strust. 
'ro sum up, during the past 'thirty years Iraq experiencC<.l significant 
social changes as evidenced by the spread of education, the growth of industr-
ialization, the modernization of agriculture, and above all the ino~'eaBing 
awareness of rights among .the mass of people. But these developments, oredit-
able as they are fall far short of what is needed to reoonstruct Iraq society. 
The crux of the problem may be stated thUB: .. ill -(,he government be 
able to pursuade or force the feud:1l lords to give up some of their privileges 
in favor of liberal reforms? The future seetlS to be wore elusive than either 
the government or the landlords are willing to admit, for if they do not 
permit sooial evolution, social revolution wIll be inevitable. 
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